Affordances are opportunities for action, and our perception of affordances plays an important role in the explanation of much of our behaviour. In the vast literature on affordances, the focus is almost exclusively on affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. This paper introduces the hypothesis that there are also affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and counting. I take the claim that our environment offers opportunities to exercise our mental abilities to be uncontroversial. The paper offers a preliminary argument for two substantive theses: that at least some opportunities for mental action are perceptible and that perception of these opportunities involves the automatic potentiation of the processes responsible for performing the available mental action.
Introduction
Affordances are perceptible opportunities for action. To perceive a teapot as grippable, for instance, is to perceive the teapot's property of affording the act of gripping. The concept of affordances, introduced by the ecological psychologist J.J. Gibson (1966) , has been applied extensively across a range of disciplines. Throughout the substantial literature on affordances, the particular affordances that theorists discuss are, with only a few exceptions, affordances for bodily actions such as gripping, walking or eating. This paper presents the hypothesis that we also perceive affordances for mental actions such as attending, imagining and calculating.
1 Although the Mental Affordance Hypothesis is 1 Is there already a concept of mental affordances in the literature? In philosophy, Scarantino mentions the possibility of mental affordances in passing (2003, pp.960-961) , and Rietveld & Kiverstein mention affordances for 'high-level' actions that might be characterised as mental (2014) . Proust (2016) posits 'cognitive affordance-sensings' but her concern is specifically with meta-cognitive feelings, and her characterisation of these affordances as non-conceptual appraisals of one's situation diverges from the conception of affordances I offer. In design theory, Hartson (2003) introduces a concept of cognitive affordances, but these are not understood as things that afford mental action, but rather things that aid an agent's understanding of the use of an artifact. Also in design theory, Zhang & Patel (2006) define cognitive affordances as those affordances that depend on background knowledge, such as a mailbox affording posting only to an agent with an appreciation of the postal system, so again their conception has little to do with mental action. In the context of artificial intelligence, Raubal & Moratz (2008) talk about affordances to perform the mental act of deliberating about which bodily affordance to act on, but does not explore the broader class of mental affordances. The concept is explored by the author in McClelland 2015 but not in any great detail. Overall, I'd ultimately answerable to the empirical evidence, a variety of theoretical and anecdotal considerations strongly suggest that we do perceive opportunities for mental action.
The paper proceeds in five stages. In the first section I explore the notion of affordances with reference to bodily actions and spell out the conception of affordances with which I am working. In the second section I outline the value of the concept of affordances. In the third I explain what it would mean for there to be affordances for mental action. In the fourth section I make a preliminary case for mental affordances based on three examples: affording covert attention; affording imagination of a bodily act and affording counting. In the concluding section I sketch a mental affordance research program that would establish whether there are mental affordances, what mental affordances there are and how mental affordances figure in our cognitive economy.
What are Affordances?
Gibson introduced the term 'affordance' in his 1966 work The Senses Considered as Perceptual
Systems. His understanding of the concept evolved throughout his career, and his most fully developed account of affordances can be found in his final work The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (1979) . In this book, he introduces the concept as follows:
The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, but the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. (1979, p. 127) Although the notion of affordances remains a key concept in the ecological school of psychology Perhaps the best strategy is to offer a fairly minimal account of affordances that retains the core theoretical value of the concept of affordances whilst avoiding too much theoretical baggage. My characterisation of affordances consists of three conditions: 1) Affordances are opportunities for action.
2) Affordances are perceptible.
3) Perception of an affordance involves the potentiation of the action that is afforded.
Let me unpack each of these conditions in turn. Regarding 1, an opportunity for action is a situation in which it is possible for an agent to deploy some ability they possess. Consider a tree's property of being climbable by me. Affordances are relativised to particular creatures, thus what is climbable for me will differ from what is climbable for you, which will in turn differ from what is climbable for a squirrel. For a tree to be climbable by me is for it to stand in a certain relation to my ability climb: it must be something toward which I can successfully deploy that ability. Some trees will stand in this relation to my climbing ability (e.g. sturdy trees with plenty of branches) and other trees will not (e.g. weak trees with too few branches). It is worth noting that this relational property of a tree exists independently of my representation of it (Gibson 1979, p. 139) . A tree can be climbable even if I don't notice its climbability, and a tree that isn't climbable may nevertheless be misrepresented as climbable by me (see Gaver 1991) . 4 The idea that items in the environment present opportunities for action, and that agents are sensitive to these opportunities, should be pretty innocuous. In fact, it's hard to see how an agent could act effectively without being sensitive to such opportunities. Much of the theoretical value of the concept of affordances lies in the more substantive claim captured by 2 that these opportunities for action are perceptible (see Gibson 1979; Michaels 2003; Dotov et al 2012) . When we observe a tree, we don't see its qualities then work out that an object with those qualities can be climbed by us. Instead, we can simply see its climbability. Gibson's key insight is that a classic 'intellectualist' model of the mind, on which agents must infer what actions are available to them on the basis of action-neutral perceptual information, is wildly inaccurate. Opportunities for action can be perceived, and our perception of those opportunities is integral to the explanation of how and why we act in the ways we do.
Condition 3 places demands on how exactly perception of an affordance works. Affordance perception is not just a matter of representing that there is an opportunity to φ. It also involves the triggering of the process responsible for actually φ-ing. 5 This is a manifestation of the intimate connection between perceptual and motor systems in the brain. Tucker & Ellis explain that 'The visual system is highly integrated with the motor system to the extent that no clear divide exists between what one could call purely visual processing and purely motor processing. ' (1998, p. 830) In line with this deep integration, there is evidence suggesting that when we see an item that affords a certain action, the motor pathways responsible for performing that action (or parts of that action) are potentiated. For instance, Tucker & Ellis (1998) found that when a subject perceives a teapot with the handle facing to her right, the motor pathways responsible for reaching to grip the pot with the right hand are automatically potentiated. The reason for thinking that this triggering is automatic is that it occurs even when the subject is engaged in a task that does not require gripping of the teapot. In the experiment the subjects' task was to push a left button to indicate that an item in a presented image is upside-down or a right button to indicate it is the correct way up (or vice versa in some trials). This is a task in which gripping the teapot is not just irrelevant but impossible.
4 Some might prefer a more liberal concept of affordances on which the thing afforded needn't be an action. Gibson (1979 p.39 ) talks about a fire affording warmth, for example, even though warmth is not an action. Michaels (2003) argues convincingly against such a liberal conception. And such liberality is especially illjudged if one accepts my third condition on affordances that their perception involves potentiation of the afforded action, since if the thing afforded is not an action then such potentiation is unintelligible. 5 The term 'involves' is deliberately non-committal. One might take the view that a subject perceives an affordance in virtue of having a motor response automatically triggered by the affording object (e.g. Tucker & Ellis 1998) . Alternatively, one might take the view that perception of an affordance involves, but is not exhausted by, the triggering of such a motor response (perhaps Millikan 2005) .
Nevertheless, the presence of the teapot's right-hand-grip-affordance interferes with subjects' performance, slowing their response time when the trial requires a left-handed button-click and accelerating it when it requires a right-handed button-click.
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To say that affordance perception requires the potentiation of the afforded action is not to say that affordance perception requires performance of the afforded action. In the teapot case, subjects do not actually reach for the teapot, but we can see from their behaviour that the pathways responsible for reaching have been activated and are influencing how the subject acts. We gain an interesting clue into how such potentiation works from the phenomenon of utilization behaviour (Brazzelli & Spinnler, 1998) . This is a condition, caused by specific brain damage to the frontal lobe, in which subjects are compelled to 'utilize' any items that they see. When presented with an apple, subjects eat it even when they are not hungry. When they pass a toilet, they begin to take off their trousers even if they don't need to use it. When they are presented with pens, they draw with them even if there's no paper to draw on. This condition has been interpreted in terms of subjects being unable to suppress the motor processes that are automatically triggered by their environment (e.g. 
What Value Does the Concept of Affordances Have?
The concept of affordances has been put to a range of important theoretical uses. These can be divided into two broad categories: the descriptive and the explanatory. On the descriptive level, the concept of affordances helps us to accurately describe our phenomenology. Many would agree that they perceptually experience the teapot not just as smooth and brown but as grippable. With the concept of affordances in our repertoire, we are better able to capture the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Although Gibson avoided much discussion of phenomenology, he does note that the concept of affordances is inspired by related concepts introduced in Gestalt psychology to describe our perceptual experience (1979, p. xiii) . The fact that the notion of affordances fits so intuitively with our phenomenology could well be responsible for why the concept has received such widespread attention (Heft 2001, p.114 This complements our best understanding of certain kinds of skilled activity: in experiences of 'flow' subjects report minimal explicit decision-making and minimal explicit awareness of the parameters of their action. In cases like these, our experience is one of being guided by perceived affordances rather than of making deliberate choices on the basis of perception (see Dreyfus 2002) .
As with so many phenomenological claims, disagreement abounds. Some claim that affordances do not figure in their phenomenology, or at least that their experience of affordances is reducible to more basic aspects of their perceptual phenomenology. When presented with the teapot, they claim, you might feel a muscular movement in your right arm and imagine reaching out to grip it, but you do not have an experience of grippability over-and-above such feelings (e.g. Prinz 2012).
Although I do not sympathise with this reductive claim, I must concede that such skepticism is hard to argue against. Those not on board with the thought that affordances make a distinctive contribution to our phenomenology must focus instead on the explanatory value of affordances, to which I now turn.
Regardless of whether and how affordances figure in our phenomenology, positing affordance perception helps us to explain the cognitive architecture of the mind. On a classic informationprocessing conception of the mind, there is a strict division between perception, cognition and action. Cisek & Kalaska explain:
In that framework, the brain is seen as an information processing system that first transforms sensory information into perceptual representations, then uses these to construct knowledge about the world and make decisions, and finally implements decisions through action. (2010, p. 270) In this 'cognition sandwich' the systems responsible for perception can only influence the systems responsible for action with the mediation of cognition, and the systems responsible for implementing an action can play no role in the detection and selection of opportunities for action.
There are a fecundity of considerations showing that this model of the mind is false. 8 What the concept of affordances provides is a particularly helpful tool for capturing some of the non-classical information processes of which our cognitive architecture is capable. When we perceive an affordance, the task of detecting opportunities is being performed (at least in part) by motorperceptual systems rather than by cognition. And because of the integration of the perceptual and the motoric, perception can trigger actions directly rather than requiring the mediation of cognition.
Furthermore, the role of motor potentiation in affordance perception means that the very systems responsible for implementing an action are implicated in the detection of opportunities to perform that action. This is not to say that cognition performs no role in affordance-guided action, or that none of our actions conform to the classical model. The point is rather that it would be a mistake to treat all mental processes as classical mental processes.
The real explanatory value of affordances emerges when we begin to reflect on why the brain would exploit such non-classical processes. Having a cognitive architecture capable of such non-classical processes has various advantages over having a strictly classical cognitive architecture. The most obvious of these are speed and efficiency.
From the onset of a stimulus, perceptual processing of that stimulus is faster than cognitive processing of it. This is not just because perceptual processes are generally faster than cognitive processes, but because cognitive processes have to wait until they receive input from perception before they can start processing the stimulus. Detecting opportunities for action perceptually is thus faster than detecting them using only cognition. How quickly one acts in response to one's environment is not just a matter of how quickly one detects and selects opportunities for action -it is also a matter of how quickly one implements the selected action. Because affordance perception involves potentiation of the available action, the process responsible for implementing the action is underway before the act has even been selected. This gives non-classical processes a speed advantage over classic processes on which the implementation of an action begins only after cognition has selected the relevant action. This advantage of speed would doubtless have significant adaptive value, especially with respect to an agent's need to respond rapidly to changes in her environment (Cisek & Kalaska 2010) .
Moving from speed to efficiency, we must note that cognition is a capacity limited resource. The most efficient cognitive architecture is one that does not give tasks to cognition that can be adequately performed using other systems. By exploting motor-perceptual systems in the detection and selection of action opportunities, we lighten the load placed on cognition. If the motorperceptual system can identify that the teapot presents an opportunity to grip, that's one less thing to work out cognitively. This is not to say that cognition plays no role in action, but rather that the efficient exploitation of cognition gives it no more of a role than is needed. A classical agent would be unable to optimise the efficient use of their cognitive capacities in this way. The advantage of efficiency bestowed by affordance perception would also have significant adaptive value, especially with respect to an agent's need to continue to act appropriately when their situation places high demands on their cognitive capacities.
The foregoing considerations do not exhaust the adaptive advantages of affordance perception.
They do, however, serve to highlight how important affordance perception is to our successful engagement with the world, which is something we must keep in mind when exploring the possibility of mental affordances.
The Mental Affordance Hypothesis
Earlier on I specified three conditions for something being an affordance. To specify what it means for something to be a mental affordance, we just have to amend these conditions so that the actions involved are specifically mental actions. This yields the following conditions: 1*) Mental affordances are opportunities for mental action.
2*) Mental affordances are perceptible.
3*) Perception of a mental affordance involves the potentiation of the mental action that is afforded.
The Mental Affordance Hypothesis is simply the claim that there exist at least some mental affordances. There exist at least some mental affordances just in case anything satisfies all three of the conditions above. I will offer my main argument in favour of the Mental Affordance Hypothesis in the next section. My aim in this section is to raise some considerations that encourage the hypothesis to be taken seriously and to set things up favourably for the argument to come.
The first consideration is that condition 1* can be satisfied fairly straightforwardly. Mental actions include (though are by no means limited to) attending, imagining, remembering, expecting, evaluating, deciding, calculating and judging. The division between mental and bodily actions is likely to be blurry. The mental act of deliberating about something may involve the overt bodily act of talking to yourself or (as we will touch on later) perhaps a covert 'off-line' bodily act of talking in your head. Nevertheless, such blurriness should not lead us to doubt that there are such things as mental acts. Opportunities for mental action are situations in which it is possible, or especially appropriate, for an agent to exercise a particular mental capacity. I imagine that everyone will accept the following claim: that there are opportunities for mental action. A stimulating documentary presents an opportunity to reflect, an old photo album presents an opportunity to reminisce, a place of worship presents an opportunity to contemplate and a fantasy novel presents an opportunity to imagine. With a little work, one could come up with a wealth of examples like these. As such, I will assume that there's no need to argue any further that 1* can be satisfied.
Can conditions 2* and 3* also be met? These conditions pertain to how the subject represents opportunities for mental action. Even if it is clear that a subject is representing such an opportunity, working out exactly how they are representing that opportunity is less straightforward. The claim that we sometimes represent opportunities for mental action perceptually, and the claim that these perceptual representations involve the automatic potentiation of the processes responsible for performing that mental action, are both answerable to the empirical evidence. We can, however, lend some initial plausibility to these claims by considering the value that such representation would have.
We have already seen that there can be advantages to bodily action being generated by nonclassical information processes rather than classical information processes. I suggest that parallel advantages apply to the generation of mental actions. A classical route to mental action would be one in which perception provides us with action-neutral information about our environment, cognition infers what opportunities for mental action are available in that environment and selects a mental act, then whatever cognitive system is responsible for the selected mental act implements it.
Speed and efficiency are just as much concerns for mental action as they are for bodily action. If we perceive mental affordances, we yield the same advantages of speed and efficiency over agents with a strictly classical cognitive architecture. It is faster to perceive an opportunity for mental action than to infer it post-perceptually, and faster to implement a mental action that is already primed than to begin implementation only after selection. In particular, this better equips us to rapidly respond to changes in our situation by altering how we are performing an ongoing mental activity or by switching to a different mental activity entirely. Regarding efficiency, it is more efficient for some of the work of detecting and selecting opportunities for mental action to be done perceptually than it is for all the work to be done cognitively. In particular, this better equips us to act appropriately when our cognitive resources are under considerable strain. Overall then, just as we can see the adaptive value of perceiving affordances for bodily action, we can see the adaptive value of perceiving affordances for mental action. Of course, the fact that it would be useful to have this non-classical cognitive architecture doesn't in itself show that we in fact have it. It does, however, provide some initial plausibility to the claim that we do enjoy such an architecture and leaves critics with the unenviable task of explaining why we would be limited to classic cognitive processes when our being so would be maladaptive.
A Case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis
In this section I make a case for the Mental Affordance Hypothesis based on three examples: affording covert attention; affording mental self-rotation and affording counting. I think the strongest case can be made for thinking that stimuli can afford covert attention. My hope is that this can act as a foot in the door that allows me to make a bolder claim about affordances for mental self-rotation, and other mental acts of imagined bodily action. This in turn provides a springboard for the even bolder claim that there are also affordances for mental acts like counting that don't seem to involve imagined bodily activity.
Affording Covert Attention
Certain stimuli call out for our attention. We've all had the experience of having our attention drawn to a sudden loud bang, for example. This reveals something about the automaticity of attention: we sometimes can't help but attend to the loud noise. Here our perception of a stimulus leads to the act of attending without the mediation of any cognitive decision to attend. In other cases, we might be aware of a stimulus as calling out for our attention yet refuse to answer this call. Consider the experience of trying to concentrate on some work when a radio is being played outside. We perceptually experience the noise as inviting our attention but can fight against this invitation and deliberately keep our attention fixed on our work. Since in this scenario we successfully avoid attending to the radio, it cannot be described as a case in which we automatically attend to the noise. It can, however, be described in terms of the potentiation of that act, since we would have attended to the noise had we not successfully suppressed that signal. And since this potentiation is something that happens whether we like it or not, even when we are firmly committed to the task of doing our work, we should conclude that the potentiation is automatic rather than deliberate.
The way that stimuli invite attention is naturally described in terms of affordance perception.
Attending is an act. The loud bang or the noisy radio present an opportunity to perform this act toward the stimulus. Furthermore, our sensitivity to such opportunities is perceptual. One doesn't hear the loud bang and infer that one ought to direct one's attention to it but instead perceives its attention-worthiness without inference. Similarly, if the radio's claim on our attention were just a matter of believing that the radio should be attended to then it would be easy to reason ourselves out of being distracted by the noise, but since the radio's solicitation of our attention is perceived we are unable to shut it off. The perception of each of these attention affordances involves the automatic triggering of our attention. In the case of the bang, we actually perform the afforded act.
In the case of the radio, the act is potentiated but suppressed.
The above suggests that attention affordances satisfy all three conditions on affordances: the attention-worthy stimulus presents an opportunity to perform the act of attending, the representation of this opportunity is perceptual, and this perceptual representation involves the potentiation of the act afforded. The only question remaining is whether the act of attention is a bodily act or a mental act. Attention can be either overt or covert. Overt attention is the bodily act of directing one's sense organs toward a particular stimulus, property or region. Covert attention is the mental act of concentrating on a particular perceived stimulus, property or region. These two layers of attention typically coincide: the focus of our gaze is normally the focus of our covert attention.
That said, the two activities must nevertheless be distinct since they are dissociable: one can deliberately direct one's covert attention toward things other than the target of one's overt attention. 9 Stimuli that afford attention thus afford not just a bodily act, but a mental act.
A number of objections might be raised against this conclusion. First, one might object that stimuli only afford overt attention. On this view, a loud noise affords the bodily act of turning one's head toward it but does not afford the mental act of covertly attending to it. Against this objection, I
would respond that when a stimulus affords overt attention it clearly affords covert attention too.
We don't, for instance, find ourselves suddenly turning toward a loud noise whilst keeping our concentration firmly on our work. In response to this, one might object that we perceive affordances for overt attention, and that when we overtly attend to something our covert attention follows suit.
As such, our covert attention is not guided by perceived affordances to perform the mental act of covertly attending. Rather, it is guided by overt attention which is in turn guided by perceived affordances to perform the bodily act of overtly attending. The difficulty with this response is that it is at odds with the empirical data. Covert attention has been found to precede involuntary eye movements (Peterson et al 2004) , so it cannot be the case that covert attention merely rides on the coat-tails of overt attention.
We are thus led to the conclusion that stimuli can afford covert attention. To accept this conclusion is to accept the existence of mental affordances. Where does this get us? What it doesn't do is offer us a dramatically new way of understanding the act of attending -indeed, my argument is premised on claims about attention supported by bith common-sense and well-established empirical data. Nor does it show that there are affordances for a wide class of mental acts of which attention is a member -covert attention is a sui generis mental act so we cannot infer that other mental acts are afforded without giving them their own assessment. What it does do, however, is suggest that there is nothing inherently objectionable about the idea of affordances for mental acts. Assuming there are affordances for bodily action, it looks very plausible that among these is the affordance to overtly attend. But once one accepts affordances for overt attention, it is hard to deny that there are also affordances for covert attention. This makes it very uncomfortable to say that the only acts that can be afforded are bodily acts, and so opens the way for us to make arguments for mental affordances more generally.
Affording Mental Self-Rotation
Sometimes we perform bodily acts in our mind: we rehearse them in imagination without actually performing them. Consider a situation in which someone is sitting opposite you at a table, and you want to know how the items on the table are arranged from their perspective: for instance, from their perspective is the fork to the right of their plate or the left? To work this out you could rotate your body round to the other agent's position and observe how the items appear from this new position. Alternatively, you could perform such self-rotation mentally and 'see' how those items appear without having to move a muscle. Psychologists such as Kessler & Thomson (2010) have provided experimental evidence that when we adopt another agent's spatial perspective we perform exactly this kind of mental self-rotation.
A situation in which an agent has a different spatial perspective to you is a situation that presents an opportunity for you to exercise your capacity to rotate yourself in imagination to their position.
Since such self-rotation in imagination is a mental act, the opportunity presented is an opportunity for mental action. Do we perceive these opportunities, and does perceiving them potentiate the processes responsible for mental self-rotation? The existing data doesn't offer a conclusive answer to these questions. Anecdotally though, it is worth reflecting on how we experience situations like these. We don't generally have to work out that mental self-rotation is needed. If we want to see things from the other agent's perspective, we seem to perform the act of self-rotation without the mediation of an inference -without some kind of practical syllogism recommending the action. The path from the observed situation to the mental action is direct, and such directness is the hallmark of affordance perception. We don't need to infer that mental self-rotation would get us to the other agent's perspective because we can simply see that this mental action is available and appropriate to the situation.
Further evidence in favour of mental self-rotation being represented in the right way comes from what we know about the process of imagining bodily acts. The neural realisation of an imagined bodily act overlaps extensively with the neural realisation of actually performing that act (Jeannerod 1995; Kessler & Thomson 2010) . This suggests that to imagine an action is simply to perform that action 'off-line'. Now, if we are on board with affordances for bodily action, it is again difficult to deny that there can be affordances for imagined bodily action. If we can perceive an opportunity to perform the bodily action of rotating ourselves to another position, why couldn't we perceive the opportunity to perform that very action off-line? There would be something ad hoc about accepting affordances for overt bodily actions but not for the corresponding covert bodily actions.
We are thus led to the defeasible conclusion that there are affordances to mentally self-rotate.
Where does this get us? Unlike the case of attention, mental self-rotation is representative of a larger class of mental actions. Any bodily act has a covert counter-part that is a mental act. And if we can perceive affordances to perform some bodily act, it is plausible we can perceive affordances to perform the corresponding mental act. We thus have preliminary evidence for a vast range of mental affordances. What we don't yet have is reason to think that there are affordances for those mental acts that cannot be understood as off-line counter-parts to bodily acts. This leads us to our third and final example.
Affording Counting
Counting is a mental act. Sometimes we count in a way that involves a bodily act of pointing to items and numbering them out loud. Sometimes we count in a way that involves doing those bodily acts off-line i.e. by pointing and numbering in our heads. It is implausible, however, that the act of counting is exhausted by such overt or covert bodily action. We can count things without performing either of these acts, and we have a brain area -the intraparietal sulcus -that is directly associated with arithmetic without being directly implicated in those bodily acts (Dehaene et al 2004) . My target here is what you might call unassisted counting: a way of counting that depends on neither covert nor overt bodily action. Our environment can present opportunities for counting. Consider a pile of pennies, or the leaves on a clover, or the cards left in a poker deck. The question is whether we perceive such stimuli as countable and, if so, whether we do so in a way that involves the automatic potentiation of our capacity to count.
A strong consideration in favour of affordances for counting comes from pathological cases. We have already discussed how the phenomenon of utilization behaviour helps us appreciate how affordance perception works. The examples of such behaviour I cited earlier were all bodily acts:
eating an apple, removing one's trousers or writing with a pen. Interestingly, the patient discussed by Brazzelli & Spinnler also showed a 'compulsion to count ' (1998, p. 350) . 10 This indicates that the act of counting is potentiated by our perception of opportunities to count. Where healthy subjects naturally suppress this act, this patient is unable to do so hence her atypical behaviour. It is worth noting that the patient's symptoms are not naturally explained in terms of atypical behavioural urges: the characteristic feature of the disorder is that the patient's behaviour is environment led, meaning that she acts on perceived opportunities for actions even if she has no desire to perform those actions. Consequently, the fact that she performs the act of counting on certain stimuli indicates that she perceives those stimuli as presenting an opportunity to count.
Whether stimuli afford counting is ultimately answerable to empirical evidence that is not yet available. Again though, we find that there would be something ad hoc about countenancing affordances for bodily action and not for mental action. If the compulsive bodily actions of Brazzelli & Spinnler's patient are to be understood in terms of affordance perception then, other things being equal, the same treatment ought to be given to her compulsive mental actions.
We are thus led to the defeasible conclusion that there are affordances to count. Where does this leave us? Counting is part of a wider class of arithmetical actions, so to the extent that one finds it 10 A complication here is that the cases of counting observed by Brazzelli & Spinnler are, of course, cases of overt counting. One might claim that it is this bodily act that is afforded rather than the mental act of counting. However, the burden of proof would be on the objector to say why this is so. Ordinary subjects perform these bodily acts to assist a mental act of determining how many of something there are, and there is no obvious reason to doubt that the patient is doing the same. Put another way, the patient is most likely compelled to make bodily gestures that aid counting precisely because she is compelled to perform the mental act of counting.
plausible that there are affordances to count one should also grant the possibility of affordances for other arithmetical actions. A pile of sweets, for example, might present an opportunity for division.
And stimuli in the language of mathematics can present opportunities for far more sophisticated arithmetical actions. A maths exam paper, for instance, might present opportunities to square, to factorise and to exponentiate. Moving beyond arithmetical actions, one might take the existence of affordances to count as reason to believe that the scope of mental affordances is unlimited. We've moved beyond affordances for off-line bodily activity to mental acts more detached from bodily action, but if we can perceive opportunities to perform one act of this kind, why not all such acts? As always, such speculation is answerable to the empirical data, but we now have some strong reasons to take such speculation seriously.
Conclusion: The Mental Affordance Research Program
My primary aim in this paper has been to offer an argument in favour of the Mental Affordance
Hypothesis: the hypothesis that we can perceive opportunities for mental action in a manner that involves the potentiation of the processes responsible for that mental action. The case of attention strongly suggests that there is at least one such affordance. The case of mental self-rotation indicates that there are also affordances for those mental acts that are best understood as off-line bodily activities. The case of counting suggests that there might also be affordances for those more abstract mental acts that are detached from bodily action. In all these cases, the evident parallels with affordances for bodily action make it hard to deny that there are also affordances for mental action.
Having made an initial case for mental affordances, what comes next? The arguments offered encourage us to engage in what we might call the 'mental affordance research program'. I have acknowledged throughout the paper that the conclusions I have reached are defeasible and ultimately answerable to the empirical evidence. An obvious first step in this research program is to test these conclusions experimentally. Can we find disorders in which subjects are unable to suppress the act of covert attention automatically triggered by their environment? Can we show that the perception of a task-irrelevant opportunity to mentally self-rotate interferes with our behaviour in much the same way as the perception of a task-irrelevant opportunity to grip the handle of a teapot does? Can we show that the brain area responsible for arithmetic is automatically potentiated by stimuli that present an opportunity to exercise one's arithmetical abilities?
If the empirical evidence comes down in favour of mental affordances, what theoretical implications might this have? In Section 2 I distinguished between the descriptive and explanatory value of the concept of affordances. The same division can be applied to the explanatory value of mental affordances. The concept of mental affordances may equip us to better describe our phenomenology. Assuming our perceptual experience is indeed characterised by affordances to attend to certain stimuli, the concept of mental affordances enables us to capture this aspect of our phenomenology. It also helps us to capture the agential experience we have when we act on a soliciting mental affordance. What it's like to allow our mental capacities to be guided by our environment's solicitations is quite different to what it is like to implement a mental act deliberately, and the concept of mental affordances allows us to capture this experience. If the experience of skilled mental action is akin to the experience of skilled bodily action, the concept of mental affordances will allow us to capture the phenomenology of 'flow' experiences in which one exercises one's expertise in a certain kind of mental activity.
Moving onto the explanatory value of mental affordances, the concept of mental affordances may better equip us to discern our cognitive architecture. Not all mental action is the result of a classical three-step process in which we perceive action-neutral properties of our environment, rationally determine what mental act to perform in light this perceptual information, then implement the selected mental action. Equipped with the concept of mental affordances we can posit processes in which opportunities for mental action are perceived rather than inferred, where the implementation of a mental action is triggered directly by perception rather than by a cognitive decision, and where the process responsible for performing that mental action is potentiated prior to selection and implicated in the perception of the relevant opportunity. The explanatory challenge will then be to offer a map of our cognitive architecture that is consistent with such non-classical mental processes.
